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Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions
of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions
Samuel R. Sommers
Phoebe C. Ellsworth
University of Michigan
The present studies compare the judgments of White and Black
mock jurors in interracial trials. In Study 1, the defendant’s race
did not influence White college students’ decisions but Black students demonstrated ingroup/outgroup bias in their guilt ratings
and attributions for the defendant’s behavior. The aversive
nature of modern racism suggests that Whites are motivated to
appear nonprejudiced when racial issues are salient; therefore,
the race salience of a trial summary was manipulated and given
to noncollege students in Study 2. Once again, the defendant’s
race did not influence Whites when racial issues were salient.
But in the non-race-salient version of the same interracial case,
White mock jurors rated the Black defendant more guilty, aggressive, and violent than the White defendant. Black mock jurors
demonstrated same-race leniency in both versions of the trial,
suggesting that racial issues are generally salient in the minds of
Black jurors in interracial cases with Black defendants.

Jury decision making is a complex set of psychological

processes in which jurors must attend to information,
evaluate theories, resolve inconsistencies, and persuade
one another in the pursuit of a verdict. Social psychologists have long recognized the courtroom as a fruitful
venue for the study of decision making and for years
researchers have investigated the cognitive and motivational processes underlying jurors’ decisions and the
procedural variables that influence them. One glaring
void in the existing research, however, is an issue that
seems to be on everyone’s minds these days: race.
In the 1990s, race captured the public’s attention in a
number of high-profile, controversial trials, but the prevalence of racial issues in American criminal law is hardly
a new phenomenon. Black defendants have suffered a
long history of abuse at the hands of the criminal justice
system, and only a few decades ago, White suspects in
crimes committed against Black victims were rarely
brought to trial, much less convicted (see Kennedy,
1997). Times have changed, of course, but maybe not as

much as we would like to think. Legal scholars have
asserted that even in this age of political correctness,
White jurors often demonstrate bias against Black defendants (Fairchild & Cowan, 1997; Parloff, 1997b). Black
jurors have not escaped criticism either, and the mantra
“Blacks won’t convict Blacks” has become a journalistic
cliché in the wake of a few well-publicized acquittals of
Black defendants by predominantly Black juries
(Reynolds, 1996; but see Parloff, 1997a, 1997b). The
assumption that jurors are affected by the race of a
defendant is so widespread that prosecutors and defense
attorneys across the country routinely incorporate racial
considerations into their jury selection strategies
(Reynolds, 1996), even though the Supreme Court has
banned the use of peremptory challenges made solely
on the basis of race (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986).
In light of the societal importance of this issue, the
dearth of psychological research on race in the courtroom is surprising. A search on PsycINFO under the
keywords “race and (juror or defendant)” yielded only
27 articles written in this decade (e.g., Rector, Bagby, &
Nicholson, 1993; Tinsley, 1991; Wittenbrink, Gist, &
Hilton, 1997). Almost none of these studies consider the
perceptions of Black jurors, and their results are inconsistent and often ambiguous. Most investigators conAuthors’ Note: The authors wish to thank Amy Bradfield, Samuel Gross,
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clude that race plays a role in juror verdicts and
sentencing1 but some have found jurors to be biased
against defendants of a different race (e.g., Klein &
Creech, 1982; Sweeney & Haney, 1992), whereas others
have found bias against defendants of the same race
(McGowen & King, 1982). Some researchers have concluded that racial effects can be erased by judicial
instruction (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991), by deliberation
(Bernard, 1979), or by the absence of inadmissible evidence (Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson, & Gatto, 1995).
Still other studies and meta-analyses find no evidence of
racial bias (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; McGuire &
Bermant, 1977).
The few experiments that do include both White and
Black participants suffer from methodological and contextual difficulties. For example, Ugwuegbu (1979) used
White participants in one study and Black participants in
a second study, making the statistical comparison of
Whites and Blacks impossible. More recently, Skolnick
and Shaw (1997) found that White mock jurors treated
White and Black defendants equally but Black mock
jurors were more punitive toward a White defendant.
However, this study, in which mock jurors were given the
trial transcript of a man accused of fatally stabbing his
White ex-wife, was conducted in Southern California
during the O.J. Simpson civil trial, and the authors
emphasize the importance of interpreting their “Black
Racism” hypothesis in terms of that unique context.
Although there is little published research comparing
White and Black jurors, a large body of work on intergroup interaction provides a psychological framework
for the theoretical and empirical consideration of race
in the courtroom. One of the most robust phenomena in
psychology is ingroup/outgroup bias. Numerous studies
have found that even when group assignment is based on
the most superficial and trivial of criteria, people demonstrate a strong preference for fellow ingroup members and tend to denigrate outgroup members (Brewer &
Brown, 1998; Tajfel, 1982). This ingroup/outgroup bias
is manifested both in behavioral terms (e.g., allocation
of resources, preference for physical proximity) and in
people’s perceptions, particularly in their attributions of
the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members
(Hewstone, 1990).
Pettigrew (1979) has demonstrated that people tend
to attribute the positive behavior of ingroup members to
inherent dispositions and the positive behavior of
outgroup members to situational forces; that pattern is
reversed for attributions of negative behavior. This finding suggests a process through which the defendant’s
race could potentially result in juror bias. Specifically, in
some cases jurors may tend to attribute the criminal
behavior of a same-race, ingroup defendant to situational pressures and the same behavior of a differ-

ent-race, outgroup defendant to an inherent disposition. For example, a White juror might explain the
behavior of a White defendant charged with robbery as
the result of pressure to provide financial support for his
family. If the defendant were Black, this same behavior
might be seen by a White juror as proof that the accused
is an aggressive and immoral person. These different
attributions imply very different perceptions of the
defendant and could potentially lead to different verdicts and/or sentence recommendations. Hewstone’s
(1990) review of intergroup causal attribution further
suggests that White and Black jurors might interpret,
integrate, and remember the evidence in a trial differently depending on the race of the defendant (also see
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985).
Building on research into ingroup/outgroup bias, we
designed Study 1 as an initial investigation of the role of
race in the courtroom, manipulating the defendant’s
race in several criminal trial summaries and comparing
the decisions of White and Black mock jurors. We were
interested not only in traditional psycholegal measures
such as guilt ratings and sentence recommendations but
also in the attributions that participants would make for
the behavior of White and Black defendants. We
expected that any racial bias demonstrated by jurors’
guilt ratings and sentence recommendations would be
present in their attributions for the defendant’s behavior as well.
STUDY 1

Method
PARTICIPANTS

Participants were recruited from two fraternities and
two sororities at the University of Michigan. One fraternity and one sorority were predominantly White, and the
other two houses were historically Black. A total of 64 students served as mock jurors in return for contributions
to their house funds. Sixty-two participants (97%) identified themselves as either White or Black, and 2 participants (3%) identified themselves as Asian American.
Because our manipulations were intended to compare
White and Black mock jurors’ decisions, the two Asian
participants were dropped from the analyses. Of the 62
remaining participants, 33 were White (53%) and 29
were Black (47%), 38 were women (61%) and 24 were
men (39%). Participants read trial summaries and
answered written questions in groups solely composed of
their fellow, same-race housemates. Four experimental
sessions ranging in size from 7 to 20 participants were
held, and all sessions were proctored by a White
experimenter.
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STIMULUS TRIALS

Participants received a packet of 12 trial summaries,
each of which consisted of one paragraph describing the
prosecution’s case and one paragraph describing the
defense’s case. Five of the trials involved a cross-racial
crime; for each such racial trial, half of the participants
read about a White defendant and half read about a
Black defendant. Preceding each of these racial trials was
a filler trial in which race was not mentioned. All participants read the 12 trials in the same order.
The five racial incidents were as follows: (a) a college
basketball player who allegedly assaulted a teammate
after a heated locker room dispute in which racial language was used; (b) a young man who, along with four
friends, allegedly surrounded a stranded motorist, told
him that he should not have been in that neighborhood,
and robbed him of his wallet; (c) a frustrated law school
applicant who was upset about racial policies in the
admissions process and allegedly held an admissions secretary hostage at gunpoint; (d) a middle-aged man who
allegedly slapped his girlfriend at a bar after she made
embarrassing comments about him in front of friends;
and (e) an older man who allegedly burned down a
church attended by congregants who were not of his
race. In all of these trials, the victim (or church congregation) and the defendant were of different races.2
We chose cases that we thought would evoke common
racial scripts, and we had no predictions about differences among the five experimental scenarios. For this
initial study, our aim was to discover whether White and
Black respondents would respond differently to the
White and Black defendants across the whole set of interracial trials. Accordingly, we considered the five trials as
analogous to five items on a scale. Of course, some differences between the trials were likely and potentially of
theoretical interest, but our hypotheses focused on the
general effects of a defendant’s race on White and Black
mock jurors’ judgments of trials with similar racial
content.
PROCEDURE

Mock jurors were told that they would be participating in a project on legal opinions and that to get a representative sample of the university population, the experimenter had recruited participants from several houses,
organizations, clubs, and teams. Participants were
instructed to read through the trial materials carefully
and to take their role as mock jurors seriously. Each trial
summary was followed by the legal criteria for conviction
for each crime, adapted from the California State Penal
Code. These definitions were included to increase the
realism of the task and to provide mock jurors with the
same verdict instructions that actual jurors receive.
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Participants used 7-point scales (1 = not at all and 7 =
very much) to respond to several posttrial questions. Participants were asked to rate how guilty they believed the
defendant was and how convincing the defense’s case
was. They also rated the extent to which (a) situational
pressures and (b) the defendant’s personal character
were responsible for his behavior. Finally, participants
were given information about the maximum sentence
allowed by the Penal Code for a defendant convicted of
the crime in question and were asked to recommend a
sentence for each defendant using options that ranged
from probation to the maximum allowable sentence.
These recommendations were then converted into a
7-point scale that increased with the severity of the
sentence.
Results
Mock jurors’ judgments of the five racial trials were
analyzed. For half of the mock jurors, three of the racial
trials had White defendants and two had Black defendants; for the other mock jurors, three of the trials had
Black defendants and two had White defendants. For
each mock juror, an average score (for each dependent
measure) was computed for the trials with a White defendant and for the trials with a Black defendant. These
average scores were then analyzed using a two-way
mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), with race of
defendant as a within-participant variable and race of
mock juror as a between-participant variable. This
allowed us to examine the general influence of race of
defendant and race of mock juror and their interaction.
We did not have specific predictions for differences in
mock jurors’ responses to the five trial summaries
because of their similar racial content.
A 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA of participants’ guilt ratings revealed that White defendants were given significantly higher guilt ratings (M = 5.28) than were Black
defendants (M = 4.77), F(1, 56) = 6.49, p < .02. No main
effect was revealed for race of mock juror, F(1, 56) < 1.
The main effect was qualified by a significant interaction
between race of defendant and race of mock juror, F(1,
56) = 5.53, p < .03, indicating that the race of a defendant
influenced White and Black mock jurors differently (see
Figure 1). White mock jurors did not differ in their guilt
ratings of White and Black defendants, t(56) < 1 via
planned comparison, whereas Black mock jurors gave
White defendants higher guilt ratings (M = 5.69) than
Black defendants (M = 4.48), t(56) = 3.35, p < .005 (see
Table 1 for summary of cell means for all Study 1 dependent measures).
This general pattern of results, that White mock
jurors seemed to be evenhanded in their judgments and
Black mock jurors seemed to demonstrate ingroup/
outgroup bias, was found in four of the five racial trials
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mock jurors were not.3 These results are consistent with
current popular media alarms about Black jurors’
refusal to convict Black defendants (e.g., Reynolds,
1996) and with the findings of Skolnick and Shaw
(1997), which the authors attribute to “Black Racism.”
However, given the long history of injustices suffered by
Black defendants at the hands of all-White juries, we
were surprised to find no effects for White mock jurors in
Study 1.
One plausible explanation involves the nature of
modern American racism. According to Gaertner and
Dovidio’s (1986; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991) theory of
aversive racism, most middle-class White Americans have
shifted from “old-fashioned” or “red-necked” racism to a
less overt form of prejudice, one that exemplifies the
conflict between an egalitarian value system and unacknowledged negative beliefs about Blacks. The theory
predicts that when racial norms are salient in a situation,
most Whites will respond in an appropriately
nonprejudiced manner, but in situations with more
ambiguous racial norms, bias will often emerge:
When a situation or event threatens to make the negative
portion of their attitude salient, aversive racists . . . vigorously try to avoid acting wrongly on the basis of these
feelings. . . . In other situations, however, the underlying
negative portions of their attitudes are expressed.
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, p. 62)

So, for example, when White people are reminded of the
possibility of racial prejudice in an interaction, they may
work to inhibit their own racial biases; if they are not reminded, they might not notice, and their biases will often be expressed.
During the course of a trial, racial issues may become
salient in any number of ways, including, for example,
pretrial publicity, voir dire questioning of potential
jurors, opening and closing arguments, the nature of
police testimony, attorneys’ demeanors, and sometimes
the nature of the crime itself, as in a Ku Klux Klan confrontation. O.J. Simpson’s murder trial provides a recent
example of a trial in which racial issues were made salient
by a defense attorney’s decision to “play the race card.”
We argue that emphasizing the racial issues in a case
tends to alert White jurors to the possibility of prejudice
and make racial norms salient. Accordingly, when racial
issues are obvious in a trial, a motivation to appear
nonprejudiced is activated in White jurors. This prediction is supported by the results of Study 1, where the
racially charged nature of the five experimental trials
probably alerted White student jurors to the possibility
of prejudice and the importance of avoiding it. A similar
process may have occurred in the study by Skolnick and
Shaw (1997), where participants were given a racially
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charged crime scenario that closely resembled the
Simpson case.
We would make different predictions for a
run-of-the-mill case in which the defendant happens to
be Black but race is not a salient trial issue. In such cases,
White jurors should not be on guard against the possibility of prejudice and they should be more likely to demonstrate racial bias. This prediction is supported by the
findings of Fein, Morgan, Norton, and Sommers (1997),
who, in a study of racial pretrial publicity, reached a similar conclusion about the potential influence of race on
White mock jurors: “If the pretrial publicity containing
the racial information had been more subtle or in a different context, participants might have been less concerned about race and, paradoxically, more likely to perceive the defendant stereotypically” (p. 499).
The theory of aversive racism is less helpful in explaining or predicting the behavior of Black mock jurors. The
“historically racist culture” that Gaertner and Dovidio
(1986) describe is White culture, and they do not discuss
the social expectations and pressures that might influence the behavior of non-White individuals. Because
Black Americans have been victimized by White bias and
institutional prejudice so frequently in the past, Blacks’
overt expression of racial preference may be more common and considered less unacceptable than similarly
biased sentiments voiced by Whites. Many White Americans are taught to believe that racism is unacceptable
and are therefore motivated to deny their prejudiced
attitudes about Blacks; Black Americans are more likely
to be raised in an environment that is mistrustful of the
egalitarian claims and promises of White America
(Shelton, 2000) and they may have no particular motivation to conceal their anti-White or pro-Black sentiments.
Accordingly, racial preference may be more available to
consciousness and more likely to be openly expressed by
Blacks than by Whites (Jones, 1997, Note 3). Thus, Black
participants in Study 1 may not have experienced the
conflict between private and public values faced by
White participants.
It is also possible that the bias demonstrated by Black
mock jurors in Study 1 reflected their perceptions that
the “true story” in the trials was different for the cases
involving Black defendants than for the identically
worded cases involving White defendants. Black participants were certainly aware, perhaps even from personal
experience, that police and prosecutors treat Blacks with
more suspicion than Whites and they may well have
assumed that racial discrimination played some role in
the cases of the particular Black defendants they were
asked to judge. In other research using the same student
population, we have found empirical evidence that
Black Americans have little faith in the colorblindness of
the criminal justice system.4 Blacks are more likely than
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Whites to believe that Black suspects suffer discrimination at the hands of White police officers and prosecutors and that Black defendants suffer discrimination at
the hands of prosecutors, judges, and juries. As a result,
Black Americans may tend to see almost all cases involving Black defendants as racially charged. In Study 1,
Black mock jurors’ bias may reflect a conscious attempt
to level the playing field through same-race leniency
(Jones, 1997) or it may reflect less deliberate differences
in perceptions of the basic meaning of the events
themselves.
These possible explanations for the performance of
White and Black mock jurors in Study 1 lead us to believe
that the scarcity of published studies of race in the courtroom may partly reflect weaknesses in the standard strategies and assumptions of social psychological research
into racial attitudes. In studies of race, concern about
prejudice against Blacks has so dominated the field that
the attitudes of Blacks usually have not been recognized
as relevant (Shelton, in press). In addition, most psychology experiments use college students as participants,
and there are often too few minority students available to
fill the cells of a complete multifactor design. Beyond the
practical limitations of the college participant pool,
another concern is that the college campus may not be
an environment conducive to valid research on expressions of White racism. College populations are
hypersensitized to racial issues and nonprejudiced
beliefs and behavior are strongly emphasized on most
campuses. The results of Study 1 suggest that it might be
difficult to get a realistic, representative measure of
Whites’ racial attitudes by studying college student participants.5 To avoid the potential influence of campus
politics in Study 2, we recruited noncollege students of
all ages as participants, a strategy that also allowed us to
better generalize our findings to the population as a
whole.
Furthermore, common sense dictates that a
researcher trying to study racial bias in mock jurors
should choose stimulus trials that make race a highly
salient issue. But given the nature of modern racial
norms, the use of such racially charged trial materials
could backfire and compel Whites to demonstrate less
prejudice than usual. In response to this concern, and
because explanations for Black juror decision making
also revolve around issues of perceived race salience,
Study 2 was designed to further compare White and
Black mock jurors by manipulating the salience of racial
issues in the stimulus trial. In this study, we manipulated
race salience by varying the content of a statement allegedly made by the defendant during the incident in question. We expected that this small change in the testimony
of one witness would create, in essence, two very different trials in the minds of White jurors. When presented

with a trial with a salient racial issue, we expected that
racial norms would be made salient and White mock
jurors would appear nonprejudiced, as they had in Study
1. On the other hand, in a trial that had no blatantly
racial issues, we expected White mock jurors to be more
punitive toward a Black defendant than toward a White
defendant. Our predictions for Black mock jurors were
that mistrust of the legal system would lead them to view
both trials with Black defendants as race salient and that
Black mock jurors would demonstrate some degree of
same-race leniency in both versions of the trial.
STUDY 2

Method
PARTICIPANTS

Two White female experimenters approached participants as they waited to depart from gates at a large international airport and asked them to fill out a questionnaire for a class project on legal opinions. Of the 211
participants who volunteered as mock jurors, 156 (74%)
identified themselves as White and 55 (26%) as Black.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 89 (M = 42.6), and
118 (56%) were men and 93 (44%) women. This study
used a 2 (White vs. Black defendant) × 2 (White vs. Black
mock juror) × 2 (race-salient vs. non-race-salient trial)
between-participants factorial design, and White and
Black participants were randomly assigned to read one
of the four versions of the trial summary.
STIMULUS TRIAL

A modified version of the barroom assault trial summary from Study 1 was given to participants. Demographic information about the defendant and the
alleged victim was provided at the top of the page. This
allowed us to convey the race of the individuals involved
in a relatively subtle manner. In the White defendant
groups, the following information was provided:
Defendant: Kevin Richman, 34-year-old White male, 6’
1”, 190 lbs., computer analyst
Victim: Tonya Simmons, 26-year-old African American
female, 5’ 5”, 125 lbs., day care worker

In the Black defendant groups, the following information was provided:
Defendant: Albert Barkley, 34-year-old African American male, 6’ 1”, 190 lbs., computer analyst
Victim: Kelly Simmons, 26-year-old White female, 5’
5”, 125 lbs., day care worker

In all versions of the trial summary, the prosecution
charged the defendant with assault and battery. The
prosecution alleged that the defendant and a group of
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coworkers were at a bar celebrating his recent promotion when his girlfriend stood up and started to “roast”
him, poking fun at his physique and making jokes about
his sexual performance. According to the prosecution,
the defendant then yelled at Ms. Simmons, forced her
into her chair, and slapped her across the face. This slap
knocked Ms. Simmons to the ground and she injured
her ankle in the fall. The defense conceded that the
defendant slapped his girlfriend but argued that she had
been drinking and making a fool out of herself, leading
the defendant to try to “talk some sense into her.” The
defense claimed that Ms. Simmons fell down because she
was drunk, and the defendant expressed remorse for
playing any role in her injury.
The crucial section of the case was Ms. Simmons’s testimony about what the defendant yelled at her. In the
race-salient versions of the trial, she testified that the
defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way
about a White (or Black) man in front of his friends”
(emphasis added) before he slapped her. In the
non-race-salient versions, she testified that he yelled,
“You know better than to talk that way about a man in
front of his friends.” The only difference between the
race-salient and non-race-salient versions was the mention of the defendant’s race in this exclamation. In other
words, the crime in question was always cross-racial, but
only in the race-salient trial did this racial difference play
an explicit role in the commission of the crime. We
expected that the race-salient statement would make
racial norms salient for White mock jurors.
PROCEDURE

Participants were asked to read the trial summary and
answer several written questions about the case. To
increase the likelihood that participants would take their
role as jurors seriously, they were told that the trial summary they were about to read was based on a real case.
After reading the case, participants were provided with
the Penal Code criteria for conviction for misdemeanor
assault and battery.
Participants used 9-point scales (1 = not at all and 9 =
very much) to respond to several posttrial questions. Participants were first asked to rate how guilty the defendant
was. To obtain more specific information about perceptions of the defendant’s personality (as opposed to the
more general attribution measure used in Study 1), we
asked participants to rate the extent to which they
believed the defendant (a) was an aggressive person and
(b) was a violent person. To indirectly measure mock
jurors’ perceptions of how salient racial issues were in
the trials, we asked participants to what extent they
believed the incident was the result of a racial conflict.6
Participants also were asked to choose a recommended
sentence for the defendant from among nine choices
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that ranged from no punishment to 6 months in jail and a
$2,000 fine (the maximum allowable punishment for
misdemeanor assault and battery according to the Penal
Code). These recommendations were then converted
into a 9-point scale that increased with the severity of the
sentence. Finally, participants were asked for demographic information and were debriefed.
Results
MANIPULATION CHECKS

At the end of the questionnaire, participants were
asked to recall the age, race, and occupation of the
defendant and victim. All participants correctly identified the defendant’s race, and there were no
between-group differences on accuracy for the other
memory questions, all χ2(7) < 6.8, ps > .46. Participants’
ratings of the extent to which the defendant’s behavior
reflected a racial conflict were used to check our
race-salience manipulation (see Note 6). The mean rating of mock jurors in the race-salient conditions was significantly higher (M = 3.59) than the mean of jurors in
the non-race-salient conditions (M = 2.02), F(1, 194) =
23.04, p < .005. These results provide support for the
validity of the manipulation.
GENERAL ANOVA RESULTS

ANOVAs revealed a significant three-way interaction
of race of mock juror, race of defendant, and race
salience for participants’ guilt ratings, F(1, 203) = 4.64,
p < .04, and for participants’ sentence recommendations, F(1, 202) = 9.20, p < .005. Participants were asked
to rate how aggressive and how violent a person the
defendant was, and these highly correlated measures,
r(n = 209) = .84, were summed to create a negative trait
rating; an ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction for this measure as well, F(1, 194) = 6.39, p < .02.
All ANOVAs performed for Study 2 used the regression
approach, and all contrasts were run using a one-way
ANOVA with eight cells to account for the unequal number of White and Black participants.
RACE-SALIENT TRIAL

Replicating the results of Study 1, in a trial where
racial issues were salient only Black mock jurors’ guilt
ratings were affected by the race of the defendant (see
Figure 2). A planned comparison indicated that White
mock jurors did not differ in their guilt ratings of the
White and Black defendant (respective Ms = 6.83, 6.50),
t(203) < 1. Black mock jurors, on the other hand, gave
the White defendant a higher guilt rating (M = 6.85)
than the Black defendant (M = 5.40), t(203) = 1.82, p =
.07. Mock jurors’ sentence recommendations also replicated the findings of Study 1: White mock jurors were
not influenced by the race of the defendant, t(202) < 1,
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of Study 2 is that in a run-of-the-mill trial in which the
defendant happens to be Black, White jurors’ judgments
are influenced by racial bias.7
Black mock jurors demonstrated same-race leniency
in both versions of the trial, and their judgments were
not significantly influenced by our race-salience manipulation. Because previous data have indicated that
Blacks have less faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system, we predicted that Black mock jurors, compared to Whites, would view both the race-salient and
non-race-salient versions of the trial of the Black defendant as somewhat racially charged. Participants were
asked to judge the extent to which the crime was racially
charged, and these ratings provided indirect support for
our predictions. Further research will be necessary to
directly test the hypothesis that in the trial of a Black
defendant, race automatically becomes a salient issue for
Black jurors. One possibility would be to use an implicit
measure of the activation of racial thoughts among mock
jurors, such as a lexical decision or word fragment completion task.
Just as in Study 1, where mock jurors’ attributions for
the defendants’ behavior were correlated with guilt ratings, in Study 2, mock jurors’ trait ratings revealed the
same bias as their guilt ratings, r(209) = .64, p < .005. This
result sheds light on the process through which race
influences juror decision making. Mock jurors did not
simply express prejudice through biased guilt ratings;
these ratings reflected their different perceptions of
ingroup and outgroup defendants’ dispositions and
hence of the very nature of the crime. Although we cannot claim a causal link between these attributional biases
and mock jurors’ guilt ratings, the role that dispositional
attributions could play in biased decision making is evident. Take, for example, a scenario in which a White
juror has come to the conclusion that a Black defendant
is guilty and should receive a long jail term. If accused by
fellow jurors (or even by his or her own egalitarianismdriven conscience) of racial discrimination, the juror
can point to the defendant’s aggressive and violent tendencies as the true reason for the guilty vote. But, in reality, this dispositional justification also has been influenced by racial bias, and this “objective evaluation” of
the defendant’s character should not assuage the racial
concerns of the juror or his or her peers.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present studies demonstrate that explicit references to racial issues in an interracial trial have different
effects on White and Black jurors. When White mock
jurors realized that a case had racial overtones, they were
on guard against prejudiced responses and maintained
the appearance of fairness. But we expected that this
racial norm would not be activated in the non-race-salient

trial, and Study 2 confirmed that White jurors tend to
demonstrate bias when race is not a salient trial issue.
These results qualify the conclusions of researchers who
argue that today’s White jurors generally are
nonprejudiced (e.g., Skolnick & Shaw, 1997) and certainly refute the extreme claim that racial bias in the
American legal system is confined to Black jurors (see
Reynolds, 1996). Relating aversive racism theory to juror
decision making provides a plausible explanation for
these results, although further research into the conditions under which White jurors demonstrate racial bias is
necessary to confirm the validity of this mechanism. For
example, other possible explanations could be that activation of racial norms in a race-salient trial increases
Whites’ concern about social desirability or that Whites’
bias depends on the stereotypicality of the crime in
question.
The present studies suggest that it is unlikely that the
concept of racial fairness has the same meaning for the
victims of discrimination as it does for the perpetrators.
White prejudice and discrimination against Blacks is one
of the most important and pervasive social problems in
America, prompting energetic efforts to maintain awareness of the issue and to instill egalitarian values. The
racial attitudes of Blacks have received far less attention
from researchers, perhaps because of the fact that Blacks
have historically been powerless to act on those attitudes
(see Shelton, in press). The present results suggest that
Blacks and Whites may experience the same tendency
toward ingroup/outgroup bias, but perhaps only Whites
are explicitly taught to stifle the expression of these attitudes, and perhaps they are only motivated to do so in
some situations.
Furthermore, the courtroom might be one of the few
settings in which Black Americans see an opportunity to
personally contribute to the elimination of racial
inequality in society. Because they are likely to view the
criminal justice system as inherently biased, Black jurors’
conception of fairness may motivate them to demonstrate a measure of same-race leniency to compensate for
that bias: “It is probably true that the burden of proof is
heavier when the evidence is viewed through
counternarrative scenario lenses, and the defendant is a
Black man” (Jones, 1997, p. 254). This idea of fairness
achieved through discrimination stands in sharp contrast to the beliefs of White mock jurors, who seem to
equate fairness in the legal system with colorblindness—
a stance that is easier to adopt when one is a member of
the more powerful majority group (Jones, 1997).
Of course, the present studies were conducted using
only five criminal trial summaries; therefore, it will be
necessary to replicate these results using a variety of stimulus trials. The trial used in Study 2 was ambiguous
enough to allow racial issues to influence jurors, but
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these racial effects might have been attenuated if the evidence in the trial had been more one-sided (either for
the prosecution or the defense) or if the crime in question had been considered more severe or heinous by
jurors. In fact, strength of evidence (Kerr, Hymes,
Anderson, & Weathers, 1995) and type and severity of
crime (Sunnafrank & Fontes, 1983) have been found by
researchers to be relevant considerations in studies of
race in the courtroom.
In addition, the assault trial we used had a few idiosyncrasies. First, issues of gender as well as of race were
raised in this case of a man accused of assaulting his girlfriend. We included gender of mock juror as an independent variable in our analyses and found no significant main effects or interactions. Nonetheless, an
interracial domestic relationship that sometimes borders on abusive might carry with it cultural and historical
baggage that make it a unique situation. Second, in the
case we used there was no doubt that the defendant had
committed the alleged act; the question of guilt revolved
around the severity of his behavior and his mental state.
It would be interesting to see whether similar racial
effects occur in a case where the defendant claims the
police arrested the wrong man. Racial bias (by police or
jurors) is possible in both types of case but the nature of
the bias might be different. In our case, bias seemed to
affect the interpretation of ambiguous behavior. In an
identification case, it could affect jurors’ judgments as to
the validity of the evidence, such as the accuracy of
police testimony or the credibility of the defendant’s
alibi. These considerations lead to several interesting
questions about the role of racial bias in juror decisions.
For example, does Black jurors’ leniency toward Blacks
reflect an overt motivation to compensate for probable
injustice or a cognitive bias toward believing there is a
good chance the defendant truly is not guilty? In other
words, do Black jurors demonstrate same-race leniency
as an attempt to level the playing field for Black defendants? Or are Black jurors, compared to Whites, more
likely to believe in the actual innocence of Black
defendants?
Beyond strength of evidence and type of crime, there
are other relevant considerations that were not
addressed by these initial studies. In Study 2, we manipulated race salience through a statement allegedly made
by the defendant, but as mentioned in the Introduction,
there are numerous ways in which racial issues can be
made salient in a trial. Pretrial publicity, either about the
particular case or about issues of racism in similar cases
(e.g., Black drivers stopped and searched more often
than Whites, Blacks treated more harshly for resisting
arrest), might make race a salient issue. Attorneys may
consciously or unconsciously emphasize race in voir
dire, opening and closing arguments, or the presenta-
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tion of evidence. Witnesses may raise racial issues during
testimony, and jurors may raise them during deliberation. It also might be possible to experimentally manipulate the salience of racial norms through nonconscious
means, such as subliminal priming. Clearly, there is no
single criterion method of manipulating race salience
among the dozens of possible techniques, and it remains
to be seen which of the various techniques have common
effects.
In addition to using only one form of race salience,
the present research investigated only the effects of the
race of the defendant and juror, whereas the racial
dynamics of actual courtrooms are obviously much more
complex. Our decision to focus on the race of the defendant and juror opens our data to alternative explanations, the most obvious of which is that the race of the victim was responsible for our findings. Race of victim has
been identified by researchers (e.g., Foley & Chamblin,
1982; Hymes, Leinart, Rowe, & Rogers, 1993) and historians as an influential factor in jury decisions. Accordingly, our findings in the non-race-salient condition of
Study 2 could be interpreted as indicating that White
jurors are more punitive toward people who commit
crimes against White victims and Blacks are punitive
toward those who harm Blacks, regardless of the race of
the perpetrator.
However, attributional biases in both of the present
studies were correlated with mock jurors’ guilt ratings
(range of rs = .30 to .64), indicating that participants’
impressions of the trial were significantly related to perceptions of the defendant. Furthermore, if the victim’s
race were driving our results, intuition suggests that
White mock jurors would have been extremely punitive
toward a defendant accused of a racially motivated crime
against a White victim; no such pattern of results
emerged in Study 1 or in the race-salient condition of
Study 2. The present data indicate that different perceptions of a defendant are significantly associated with different guilt judgments, but the role of the victim’s race
cannot be determined on the basis of the studies
reported here, and it remains a variable that should considered in future research.
It is also important to consider that participants in the
present studies did not deliberate before rendering their
posttrial ratings. Full-scale jury deliberation studies are
enormously time-consuming and expensive, and it
makes sense to begin a line of research with studies of
individual jurors to assess which variables are most promising for further investigation. But as Bernard (1979)
forcefully argues, the generalizability of many psychological studies of juror decision making is questionable,
and most experiments ignore the role of deliberation in
the decision process entirely. It is worth noting, however,
that distributions of individual juror votes have been
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found to be very reliable predictors of jury verdicts
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), especially for simple guiltyversus-innocent verdicts on a single charge as we used in
the present research. But Bernard’s (1979) point is well
taken, and we plan to investigate how deliberation
affects the influence of race on mock jurors. The effects
of deliberation will almost certainly vary with the racial
composition of the jury (see Kerr et al., 1995), with a
plausible initial hypothesis being that biases will be exaggerated in racially homogeneous juries but attenuated in
racially mixed juries.
Conclusion
The present studies fill a gap in the psycholegal literature by comparing the decisions of White and Black
mock jurors, and they identify a critical variable in juror
decision making: race salience. More broadly, our findings suggest that explicit reference to ingroup/
outgroup issues might play a role in other types of intergroup interactions, affecting majority and minority
group members in different ways. It might be worthwhile
for psychologists to consider the role of salience in a variety of ingroup/outgroup scenarios, such as employment
interviews, application evaluations, and everyday character appraisals and behavioral predictions. One can easily
imagine that explicit reference to issues of gender could
have very different effects on men and women in a given
situation, that highlighting the relevance of sexual orientation could affect heterosexual and gay people differently, and so on. Based on the results of the present studies, it seems that a group’s solidarity and status within
society could be an essential variable for predicting the
way in which people make decisions about ingroup and
outgroup others.
Returning to the original questions of this investigation, have modern White jurors learned to inhibit prejudicial attitudes? The present studies suggest that they
must first be reminded of racial norms. Is it true that
“Blacks won’t convict Blacks?” In the present studies,
Black jurors were consistently more lenient toward Black
defendants, but our results do not support the conclusion that Black jurors refuse to convict Black defendants.
Black mock jurors gave Black defendants higherthan-midpoint guilt ratings in both of the studies
reported here, and in pretesting we have repeatedly
found conviction rates in the 70% to 80% range among
Black mock jurors judging Black defendants. It is important to point out that in spite of any tendency to correct
against perceived injustices in the legal system, Black
jurors still appear to give Black defendants high guilt ratings and make some dispositional attributions for their
negative behavior. It is also worth emphasizing that the
present studies suggest that White jurors (and by exten-

sion White police officers, White judges, White lawyers,
etc.) still demonstrate bias in cases where racial issues are
not emphasized, justifying Black jurors’ skepticism
about the fairness of the criminal justice system.
NOTES
1. It is difficult to gauge how robust these racial effects are, however.
Studies that find no evidence of racial bias are unlikely to be published,
creating a “file drawer” problem that has undoubtedly contributed to
the inconsistencies in the literature.
2. A more complete 2 × 2 × 2 design that also manipulated race of
victim would have been preferable, but this study served as an initial
investigation into race in the courtroom, and we chose to focus our
resources on the two most central courtroom players: the defendant
and the juror. The use of exclusively cross-racial crimes leaves open the
possibility that jurors were influenced by the victim’s race and not the
defendant’s race, an issue that we will address in the General Discussion. Our predictions and data, however, are consistent with the
assumption that the defendant’s race was a significantly influential factor in mock jurors’ decisions, and we have obtained similar results in
another experiment that used a trial in which the defendant was
charged with a “victimless” crime. Another approach in the present
study would have been to withhold from participants information pertaining to the victim’s race, an alternative we rejected as unrealistic
because jurors always have access to this information in an actual trial.
To hold the victim’s race constant across conditions would have been
similarly inappropriate because that would have produced some conditions with cross-racial crimes and some with same-race crimes. We used
cross-racial crimes in all conditions because many critiques of Black
jurors have focused on their performance in interracial trials (see
Reynolds, 1996) and because doing so allowed for the race-salience
manipulation used in Study 2. Nevertheless, a systematic analysis of the
effects of a victim’s race on mock jurors is a necessary future step for the
investigation of race in the courtroom.
3. It is statistically difficult to determine the relative influence of
ingroup preference and outgroup derogation in jurors’ decisions. In
Study 1, Black mock jurors’ judgments of White defendants do not significantly differ from Whites’ judgments of White defendants, and the
same is true for judgments of Black defendants. Black mock jurors,
however, significantly differ in their own ratings of White and Black
defendants. We refer to this result as same-race leniency out of theoretical considerations that are addressed later in the Study 1 Discussion.
But we do not rule out the possibility that anti-White sentiment is also
responsible for this finding to some degree. To acknowledge this ambiguity, we use the neutral terms ingroup/outgroup bias and racial preference
throughout this article, except in instances when we believe there is
reason to conclude that either ingroup or outgroup attitudes are
chiefly responsible for the effect.
4. When asked to use a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = very much)
to rate the extent to which a defendant’s race affects whether he or she
receives a fair trial, Whites’ mean response of 4.69 was significantly
lower than Blacks’ mean of 6.89, F(1, 182) = 19.57, p < .001 (Sommers &
Ellsworth, 1998).
5. Of course, many noteworthy experiments involving stereotyping
and prejudice have used college students as participants. But, in recent
years, a good number of these studies have focused on subconscious
priming effects and other implicit measures of prejudice (e.g., Devine,
1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, & Johnson, 1997; Wittenbrink,
Judd, & Park, 1997). Implicit measures could be used in studies of the
legal system to gauge participants’ opinions about defendants or interpretations of trial evidence. However, not much is known about the
connection between implicit responses and juror behavior, and an initial investigation into the role of race in the courtroom seems best
served by the explicit measurement of mock jurors’ perceptions used
in the present studies. We would also add that college populations may
be quite appropriate for understanding other, nonracial aspects of jury
behavior, such as the effects of jury size, the order of presentation of
evidence, and so forth.
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6. A direct measure would have asked, “To what extent did racial
issues influence your perceptions of the trial?” But we believed that participants would be unable and/or unwilling to answer this question
accurately (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Because our race-salience
manipulation involved the racial motivation for the alleged crime, we
used perceptions of the racial nature of the crime itself to indirectly
gauge how salient racial issues were in the minds of mock jurors as they
read the trial.
7. Had we selected a different race-salience manipulation that portrayed the defendant in a more sympathetic light (e.g., pretrial publicity about racial taunts he had endured), we would expect that White
jurors would give equally lenient guilt ratings to both defendants in the
race-salient condition and to the White defendant in the
non-race-salient condition but a higher guilt rating to the Black defendant in the non-race-salient condition. The crucial comparisons, however, would remain those between the White and Black defendant conditions of each version of the trial, with racial prejudice expected only
in the non-race-salient version. The finding that the White defendant/non-race-salient cell had the lowest average guilt rating of the
four White juror groups in the present study was not one of our predictions, and in a study using a different race-salience manipulation, we
would not necessarily expect to replicate that result.
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